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Inter-organizational collaboration is often considered essential to transboundary fishery governance, due, in part,
to the high levels of task interdependence, the remote and often treacherous conditions, and the limited levels of
information available to any policy actor on resource status. In the high seas, Regional Fisheries Management
Organizations (RFMOs) are responsible for sustainably managing highly migratory and straddling fish stocks
through the implementation of ecosystem-based approaches and ensuring adequate inter-jurisdictional cooper
ation. A central question facing RFMO governance is therefore how to structure and sustain inter-organizational
transboundary collaboration under high uncertainty? This paper presents the case of the North Atlantic Salmon
Conservation Organization (NASCO), conceptualized as a strategic alliance between the bureaucratic organiza
tions responsible for north Atlantic salmon fishery management in the member countries. We identify and
explain how dimensions of trust, control, and perceived risk have structured the collaborative performance of the
alliance. The application of an integrated trust-control-risk framework increases conceptual clarity for how,
when and why alliance managers might seek to develop different forms of trust through different management
control systems in ways that further multi-actor collaborative network performance. Future research needs are
identified, including better understanding how managerial strategies and control mechanisms facilitate interorganizational trust in transboundary governance settings and mitigate the perceived risks of working together.

1. Introduction
“States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and man
agement of living resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose
nationals exploit identical living resources, or different living resources in
the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the
measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned.
They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional
fisheries organizations to this end.”
Article 118, United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas.

Environmental change resulting from natural resource extraction
and global climate change presents a significant transboundary gover
nance challenge, not least for fisheries [63,13,71]. In the high seas,1
where 34.2% of all fished species are considered overfished [24],
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)2 are respon
sible for sustainably managing marine living resources through the
implementation of ecosystem-based approaches and ensuring adequate
inter-jurisdictional cooperation [30,26,23]. RFMOs are international
organizations (IOs) established by member states to coordinate their
bureaucracies in an effort to realize collective outcomes, generally with
the administrative support of an international treaty secretariat [31,73].
They are known to face many organizational challenges, with their
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1
Areas beyond the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) granted to coastal states under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) [62].
2
Building from the UNCLOS and the subsequent UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), highly migratory and straddling fish stocks require international cooperation
through sub-regional or regional fisheries management organizations, which can adopt legally binding conservation and management measures [18].
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effectiveness being regularly questioned [16,31]. Considerable research
attention has subsequently been placed on evaluating the performance
of RFMOs (see, for example, [14,23,32,62,65,26]) with issues related to
transparency, participation, monitoring and data, management mea
sures, compliance and decision-making being common themes [14,18,
31,34,53]. Inter-organizational collaboration is often considered
essential to transboundary fishery management, due, in part, to the high
levels of task interdependence, the remote and often treacherous con
ditions, and the limited levels of information available to any policy
actor on the resource status. A central question facing RFMO governance
is therefore how to structure and sustain inter-organizational trans
boundary collaboration under high uncertainty?
According to Pintassilgo et al. [66], highly migratory and straddling
fish stocks (i.e., species that migrate between the high seas and the areas
of national jurisdiction) can be regarded as common pool resources
shared between RFMO members (and non-members), making the level
of cooperation, participation and the stability of these organizations key
to effectiveness (see also [18,62]). Managing common pool resources
requires regular and ongoing inter-organizational communication in
order for the actors involved to be able to understand, plan, coordinate
and implement the work that requires collaboration [3,76]. Stern [76],
considers collaboration to be “the most fruitful form of interaction
leading to the greatest potential for long-lasting and resilient solutions to
environmental problems”, enabling a broader array of ideas and stra
tegies to be considered, the reduction of unproductive conflict, and the
leveraging of resources (including social networks and capacity) to
achieve goals, and enhance efficiency in the long term. We consider
inter-organizational collaboration to involve varying degrees of
networking (communication and information exchange for mutual
benefit), coordination (aligning or altering activities to enhance effi
ciency), and cooperation (sharing resources for achieving compatible
goals) in a dynamic process though which entities “share information,
resources and responsibilities to jointly plan, implement, and evaluate a
program of activities to achieve a common goal” [11]. While it has been
identified that management strategies, risk perceptions, and trust are all
important to the inter-organizational collaborative performance of
environmental IOs [46,72,80], there has been little-to-no research
integrating these concepts in the study of transboundary marine fish
eries generally, and RFMOs specifically.
This paper presents the case of the North Atlantic Salmon Conser
vation Organization (NASCO), an established IO that we conceptualize
as a strategic alliance between the organizations responsible for salmon
fisheries management in the member countries. Using an integrated
trust-control-risk framework, we argue that NASCO’s historical devel
opment as a treaty organization, and subsequent management as an
alliance network, can be used to identify key attributes that affect the
collaborative performance of the organizations involved in trans
boundary fisheries management.

have considerable influence in treaty implementation, shaping power
relations between states through distributing and building capacity,
framing problems and disseminating information used in decision-
making [40,73].
At the bureaucratic level of decision-making, IOs operate as interorganizational networks [43]. According to Imperial [38], these net
works involve a group of “organizations that form temporary or per
manent alliances for a limited purpose or common area of involvement
[1,2]”, where the “action set is oriented toward the collective activity of
a group of organizations [2,49]”. Importantly, inter-organizational
networks arise from individual participants being directed to represent
their organizations and therefore only communicate in so far as indi
vidual representatives communicate, share information and actively
participate in the alliance [9]. Previous research has identified a special
role for the organizations composed of other organizations that take a
leadership role in coordinating collaborative activities, such as pooling
resources, distributing tasks, and collectively making decisions [38],
referring to them variably as network brokers [48], coalitions, alliances
or strategic alliances [27–29], network administrative organizations
[69] and/or collaborative organizations [38].
In this paper, we conceptualize RFMOs as a form of strategic alliance
network [29], where an agreement is reached between at least two
partner organizations that (a) they remain legally independent, (b) share
benefits and managerial control over the performance of assigned tasks,
and (c) make contributions in strategic areas [44,86]. In this “network”
form of governance, action is deeply embedded in social networks3 of
relationships, which in turn shape and define the precursors, processes,
and outcomes associated with alliances [28,67]. Child and Faulkner
[12] note that inter-organizational alliances “are often ‘strategic’ in the
sense that they have been formed as a direct response to major gover
nance challenges or opportunities which the partner firms face.” Ac
cording to Delrue [19], an “alliance” is a relationship where the parties
maintain autonomy but are inter-dependent to a non-trivial degree. As a
result, partners in alliance relationships can be both cooperative and
non-cooperative, which presents certain risks to collaborating and raises
the importance of trust and control mechanisms when trying to under
stand collaborative performance [17,19].
3. Trust, control and risk in inter-organizational alliance
networks
Previous research suggests that different dimensions of trust, control
and risk interact in complex ways to affect the formation, governance
structure and performance (ie., knowledge sharing and collaboration) of
inter-organizational alliance networks [17], with implications for how
organizations with strategic interdependencies work together [28]. Das
and Teng [17] present an integrated framework of how trust and control
are inextricably linked with risk in strategic alliances and how managing
the different inter-relationships between these constructs enables orga
nizations to effectively collaborate. They consider both control and trust
to be primary antecedents of perceived risk, with all three constructs
comprised of multiple dimensions (see Fig. 1). This conceptualization of
the factors affecting inter-organizational collaboration within alliance
networks offers a useful starting point for further exploring some of the
social dynamics likely affecting transboundary fisheries governance
networks. According to Das and Teng [17], if the perceived risks of
collaborating are too great, actors within an alliance will refuse to
collaborate on certain tasks, causing the alliance network to change
shape or to fragment. Partners within alliance networks therefore
employ different forms of control and willingness to trust, either jointly
or separately, to manage and reduce their perceived total risk of

2. International organizations as inter-organizational networks
Studies on international political cooperation have previously
highlighted the functional characteristic of international treaties,
showing that they often develop in response to evolving scientific
knowledge of environmental problems or changing problem definitions
[20,33,47]. The resulting IOs have been shown to facilitate cooperation
by: lowering transaction costs and providing monitoring when mutual
gains are available through collaboration [41]; enabling the develop
ment of coordinated focal points for negotiation when actors are con
cerned about the distributional implications of cooperating [42,50]; and
changing the ways that alliance members in the network understand
problems [35]. While there has already been considerable scholarship
on the political processes involved with the creation and function of IOs
in different policy contexts [43], there has been less focus on the bu
reaucrats and agencies involved in administering IOs, including secre
tariates. This is surprising, given that recent research suggests they can

3
“a set of nodes (e.g., persons, organizations) linked by a set of social re
lationships (e.g., friendship, transfer of funds, overlapping membership) of a
specified type” [45]: 458).
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Fig. 1. Integrated framework of trust, control and risk in strategic alliance networks (adapted from [17]).

cooperating [17].
Perceived Risk: (or subjective risk) relates to the estimated proba
bilities of several outcomes [17]. It concerns ‘risk taking in relationship’
in order to differentiate it from more general risk-taking behaviours
because it can only occur in the context of a specific, identifiable rela
tionship with another party [51]. It is particularly relevant to managing
strategic alliances because of the uncertainty associated with coopera
tion among partners [17]. Distinguishing between the different di
mensions of perceived risk presented in Fig. 1 is essential because
depending on which risk is perceived as being more of a threat, actors
within an alliance will decide on strategies that can best acquire the
resources they require from others while protecting their own - often
reflected in the alliance structure [17]. Different forms of trust and
control will be used by alliance partners to reduce the perceived prob
ability and impact of undesirable outcomes, and, according to Das and
Teng [17], there is no third determinant of comparable importance.
Trust: is defined as the “psychological state in which one actor (the
trustor) accepts some form of vulnerability based upon positive

expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another (the trustee),
despite inherent uncertainties in that expectation” [78] citing [54,70].
Within strategic alliance networks, trust is considered a key element in
cooperative relationships, lessening concerns about opportunistic
behaviour and reducing the need for formal control mechanisms [17,21,
76]. Because trust is specific—in relation to the context, subject, and
object of trust—the different dimensions presented in Fig. 1 are often
inter-dependent, potentially existing along two non-exclusive spectra (a
positive trust spectrum and a distrust spectrum) with different trust
types fitting different niches and serving different functions at various
stages in a collaborative management process [59,77].
Control: According to Das and Teng [17], control is about influencing
the behaviour of alliance partners, in contrast to trust, which moderates
risk perception without doing anything about the behaviour of the
partner. Control mechanisms that are designed to moderate perceived
risk can be formal or informal, relying on a level of trust to facilitate
relationships [19]. Formal control (including behavioural and output
controls) can undermine trust within collaborative networks because

3

G.M. Hickey et al.

Marine Policy 134 (2021) 104772

they reduce autonomy and create doubt about the goodwill of partners,
while informal control (social control) is thought to increase trust [17].
Control is both an antecedent to, and output from, trust in interorgani
zational networks [67], and can have both positive and negative impacts
on collaboration.
We apply these concepts to the case of NASCO, an interorganizational fishery management alliance (i.e, RFMO) that has oper
ated for over 35 years. We focus on the formation of the alliance, its
governance structure, aspects of its dynamic evolution and explain some
of the benefits of entering the alliance (as recommended by [28]). Our
objective is to illustrate how different dimensions of Das and Teng’s [17]
framework of trust, control, and perceived risk are relevant to trans
boundary fishery management collaboration and change through time.

developed within the alliance? What activities have increased or
decreased actor perceptions of risk? What has influenced the choice of
governance structure and what are the features of the control package(s)
employed in the alliance? To explore these questions, we trace and
explain the development of and interactions between members of the
alliance over time using key events as examples.
5.1. Background
According to Bubier [10] managing and conserving Atlantic salmon
is one of the most difficult tasks facing the political jurisdictions that the
highly migratory fish encounters. Salmonids are a family of finfishes that
spawn in freshwater and occupy the marine environment at later stages
of their life history. Atlantic salmon deposit eggs, which are fertilized in
select freshwater streams. Eggs develop into fry, then live in freshwater
for up to four years before leaving their rivers of origin for the marine
environment, where they experience drastic growth due to the abun
dance of food in the marine system. Adults spend at least two years at
sea, then return to their rivers of origin to spawn, with a small per
centage not dying and returning to the marine environment to repeat the
cycle [10]. The migration and distribution of Atlantic salmon covers
thousands of kilometres, which sets them apart from other North
Atlantic finfishes. Atlantic salmon from rivers in the Gulf of Maine and
northward into Northern Quebec swim to feeding grounds in the waters
around Greenland [4], as do salmon originating from the Barents Sea
(see Fig. 2). As a result, Atlantic salmon are subject to a wide range of
differing, and at times conflicting, management regimes over their
five-to-six-year lifespan [10,83].
Salmon experience natural as well as fishing-based mortality, which
in turn limits the number of individuals that may return to their rivers of
origin [25]. More recently, the rapid expansion of aquaculture produc
tion is further threatening wild salmon stocks through the genetic effects
of farmed Atlantic salmon escaping and mortality from sea lice and
diseases [57]. Beyond the need for appropriate siting of aquaculture
facilities and associated sea lice control, reducing fishing pressure is
considered one of the best ways to improve stock viability [36,39].
Overall population estimates of Atlantic salmon show that stocks have
experienced declines since the 1970′ s [61], with some individual stocks
exhibiting stock sizes that are below, as well as above, spawning
escapement reserves [36,39]. At the same time, catches of Atlantic
salmon have steadily declined over the last fifty years.
Recognizing the transboundary governance challenge, policy actors
including recreational anglers, Indigenous resource users, fishery man
agers, fisheries scientists, fisheries policymakers, conservationists, and
industry representatives from the different jurisdictions impacting wild
Atlantic salmon survival created working groups to coordinate infor
mation collection and collective action, culminating in the signing of the
Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean
in 1982, and subsequent establishment of the North Atlantic Salmon
Conservation Organization (NASCO) in 1984 [81,83]. The Convention
created a large, protected zone beyond the fisheries jurisdiction of the
coastal states where Atlantic salmon fisheries were no longer allowed. It
also prohibited salmon fishing in most areas within coastal state juris
diction beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast [56]. Furthermore, it
requires the Contracting Parties (the “Parties”) to provide regular re
ports on salmon catches, to collect scientific data on stock status, and to
provide to NASCO information on domestic management initiatives and
regulatory measure implemented [81].

4. Analytical approach
We adopted an exploratory case study approach [85] utilizing doc
uments (newspaper articles, publicly available reports, policy agree
ments, academic research papers, websites) and archival records
(memos, annual reports, meeting minutes, press releases) as sources of
evidence. Exploratory case study research “investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” [85],
generating outputs that aim to provide a sharpened understanding of the
situation, and what might be important for interest groups to look at in
future research [74]. An exploratory approach was appropriate due to
the lack of previous empirical research integrating different dimensions
of trust, control and risk in transboundary fishery management [85].
Descriptive qualitative analysis consisted of “three concurrent flows of
activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing / verifi
cation” [52]. Data analysis was conducted using content analysis [5] and
pattern-matching [52], guided by the integrated trust-control-risk
framework presented in Fig. 1 [17]. The analytic strategy therefore
relied on the theoretical propositions of the study and analyzing the
evidence based on them, helping to focus attention on certain data and
to ignore other data [85]. This required a restricted approach to content
analysis, focussing on the propositions to be investigated and, in turn,
the texts to be included as data [8].
There are limitations associated with the analysis, including reliance
on secondary data sources and our desire to explore the potential of Das
and Teng’s [17] conceptual framework to inform transboundary fish
eries scholarship, which may have led to researcher bias when it comes
to selecting relevant data. As noted by Strang and Wittrock [79], our
results should be considered as offering only partial insight into an al
ways more complex reality. We also acknowledge that our analytical
method is limited to recorded communications that, when used alone,
raises questions about validity and reliability [8] that will require future
empirical research involving primary data to address. Nevertheless, as
noted by Berg and Madsen [6] relying solely on secondary data is
“arguably a pragmatic choice when given the multitude of challenges
that researchers encounter when attempting to map the diffusion and
evolution of management (accounting) concepts and ideas” (see also
[79]).
5. Case: The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization
(NASCO)
NASCO is a prominent RFMO dedicated to the restoration, conser
vation, and management of wild Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) in the
North Atlantic region. The analysis focuses on the following questions:
What characteristics of the relations between bureaucratic actors in
fluence risk perception? How has trust (goodwill and competence) been

5.2. Structure and function of NASCO
NASCO is an RFMO formed to contribute to the conservation,
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Fig. 2. Migration routes of the North Atlantic salmon. Credit: Atlantic Salmon Federation, 2018.

restoration, enhancement, and rational management of salmon stocks
throughout their migratory range while considering the best scientific
evidence available through consultation and cooperation among actors
[10,56]. It has six Contracting Parties: Canada, USA, Denmark (for
Greenland and Faroe Islands), the EU, Norway and Russia.
The primary forum for the exchange of information in support of
coordination and cooperation among Parties is its Council, which su
pervises the administrative and financial affairs of the organization, as
well as managing external relations, communication among members
and between members and non-members [56,81]. The criteria for
participation in NASCO Council are set forth in the NASCO Handbook.4
Each party is authorized to appoint no more than three representatives,
who accompany experts and advisers, to NASCO Council. Given large
interest among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the
recognized value that NGOs can offer to NASCO’s mandate, in 1985,
specific criteria were established to allow for NGO inclusion in meetings.
Following a strategic review termed the “Next Steps” process in 2004,
the relationship between the organization, the Parties and its stake
holders became a greater focus, with the procedures for NGO partici
pation expanded [56,81].
In addition to having a Council, a Secretariat, and a Research Board,
NASCO also has four Commissions, which divide all organizational ac
tivities into regions (Fig. 3). Each Commission consists of relevant Party
member representatives, with each member having one vote. All de
cisions taken by the Commissions must be unanimous, with the option
for any Party to abstain in order for the proposal to go forward [10].
According to Bubier [10], this need for unanimous consent likely reflects
the reality that NASCO, like other international treaties, lacks enforce
ment power. Therefore, member states who object to measures are not
bound by the decision-making outcome.
Key to NASCO is the regular development of fisheries science and
biological advice through the International Council for the Exploration
of the Sea, or ICES. ICES, also an international organization, includes the
Working Group on North Atlantic Salmon, or WGNAS. NASCO affiliates
and their member states contribute to, and are informed by, the annual
reports produced by members of the WGNAS. ICES and NASCO provide
a high-level, intergovernmental structure to improve the understanding
of wild salmon stocks and governance of salmon resources in the North
Atlantic. While both organizations are responsible for disseminating
scientific information or biological advice, NASCO provides the venue
for transboundary fishery governance [81]. Since its establishment,

NASCO has introduced significant changes to Atlantic salmon fisheries,
including reductions in quotas, fishing effort and even closures [56,83,
84], with most efforts to design and implement regulatory measures
largely directed toward Greenland. NASCO and in particular the West
Greenland Commission have identified the status and origin of salmon
stocks at Greenland and affiliates have worked together to establish
quotas to limit the catches of salmon [84]. In the inaugural year of
NASCO, a catch quota of 870 tonnes was established, which has since
been steadily reducing to just 30 tonnes in 2020. While NASCO’s initial
focus was on regulating salmon fisheries in West Greenland and the
Faroe Islands, it has broadened its purview over time to include habitat
protection and restoration, fishery management in States of origin and
aquaculture [56,81].
5.3. Motivations for establishing NASCO
The life history and distribution of Atlantic salmon stocks causes high
levels of task interdependence between different agencies and necessi
tates international communication and cooperation to ensure that
salmon industries exist into the future [83]. As noted by Bubier [10], the
salmon conservation measures in one country are only as effective as the
corresponding measures in another. However the United States, Canada
and European nations have no management control once the salmon
have left their waters, resulting in a situation where so-called ‘states of
origin’ are unable to unilaterally conserve their domestic salmon pop
ulations [10].
The impetus of this emerging alliance network was to respond to the
offshore salmon fishery developing along the coast of West Greenland in
the 1960′ s. A bilateral agreement in the 1970′ s between the United
States and Denmark, in recognition of its territorial jurisdiction over
Greenland, represented the first step towards setting quotas and served
to phase out high seas fishing by 1976. However, the agreement did not
last and was terminated in 1980 due to the introduction of 200 nautical
mile limits by most countries of the North Atlantic [83]. Realizing that
bilateral agreements were insufficient for managing a species that
travels through several coastal state waters, and in recognition of the
lack of an organized response following the termination of the 1970′ s
agreement, the US State Department worked with interest groups and
countries to draft a multilateral treaty (see [81]). While there was
disagreement over the structure and authority of any proposed inter
national organization designed to implement the treaty, a decentralized
approach where authority rested in several sub-commissions was
decided [10].
During the years leading up to NASCO’s formation, coastal states and
their policy actors recognized their high levels of interdependence,

4
NASCO Handbook, NASCO, http://www.nasco.int/pdf/reports_other
/NASCO_Handbook.pdf (accessed July 28, 2020).
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Fig. 3. Total reported nominal catch of Atlantic salmon (tonnes of round fresh weight in four North Atlantic regions 1960–2017. Credit: ICES WGNAS.

enforcement capacity (ie., Propositions 1 and 2, Fig. 1).

causing them to seek collaboration on Atlantic salmon conservation and
management [83,84]. Applying Das and Teng’s [17] framework, there
are perceived risks associated with inter-organizational alliance forma
tion, including relational and performance risks. An example of rela
tional risk would be the likelihood and consequence of not having
satisfactory cooperation among organizations in member states, in this
case potentially resulting in goal conflict, high transaction costs, loss of
autonomy or sovereignty and deviance from agreements. Performance
risks are the likelihood and consequence that alliance objectives are not
achieved despite satisfactory cooperation. In this case, performance risk
is manifest as the potential to waste time and resources and associated
opportunity costs. We expect the actual perceived risks of collaborating
differ among the organizations involved, given that individual govern
ments and NGOs have voiced concern about the risk of losing their local
investments to manage, conserve, and improve salmon stocks when
other coastal states enjoy the largest return on their investment [22].
Historic controversy on this point was leveled at Greenland and the
Faroe Islands, whose coastal state economies derived revenue from
salmon fisheries [75]. Coastal nations with large recreational or tradi
tional fishery economies are known to have perceived their risks
differently, with at least one NGO arguing that an objective approach
that failed to account for varying stakeholder perceptions was why early
NASCO agreements were unsuccessful [64].
Recognizing their high levels of interdependence, a situation
amplified by the declining salmon stocks, ultimately led the Parties to
ratify the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North
Atlantic Ocean [83], signaling a desire to cooperate and collaborate on
management despite the perceived risks. Potential relational risks were
initially addressed through the requirement to establish an international
organization, NASCO, with a management mandate to facilitate
“consultation and cooperation” among the organizations involved
(behaviour controls). NASCO also has a mandate to ensure “the best sci
entific evidence available” is used in decision-making which is pursued
through output controls such as assessment reports and action plans (see
[81]) in order to help mitigate performance risk (i.e., Proposition 4,
Fig. 1). Preceding the signing of the treaty and subsequent establishment
of NASCO was a necessary degree of trust among the member Parties to
act in good faith, assessed based on their reputations for dealing fairly in
previous transboundary resource management alliances (goodwill trust)
and ability to contribute the necessary resources and expertise to ensure
the alliance performs (competence trust), in this case potentially
involving scientific evidence, funding, infrastructure, monitoring and

5.4. Managing the relationship
The Convention is the underlying instrument facilitating the
bureaucratic alliance and subsequent participation in NASCO activities.
The Convention sets the mandate, budget as well as the limits of the
international organization (output controls). It addresses who is repre
sented and in what capacity (behaviour control), how decisions are taken
and conflicts resolved (social control), how business is conducted, the
transparency of proceedings, and who is allowed to observe (behaviour
controls). Relationships among NASCO officers and representatives are
maintained through regular correspondence with respective members of
each Commission (e.g., North American Commission, West Greenland
Commission) and through annual meetings (behaviour controls). Annual
meetings also serve the purpose of social control, facilitating interorganizational cultural blending [87] by creating a venue for sharing,
discussing, and revising shared values and norms, including which kinds
of scientific and regulatory activities should be prioritized [81]. Meet
ings also serve as a venue for output control, facilitating goal convergence
and the setting of shared objectives as the annual check-ins ensure that
Parties’ agreed progress on activities is being satisfactorily met, and if
not, that Parties have an opportunity to develop resolutions to any set
backs encountered. NASCO’s careful documentation and archive of ac
tivities ensures accountability and transparency. Examples include
adjusting catch quotas to account for overharvest in a previous year
[56], or revising a sampling program to account for new techniques or
stocks [58].
The collaborative performance of an inter-organizational alliance
depends heavily on the positive and negative feedback relationships
existing between control and trust over time. For example, within the
NASCO alliance, behaviour controls have been supplanted by competence
trust, as individual representatives or organizations demonstrate the
capacity to meet the given management objectives (in line with Propo
sitions 2 and 9b). Varying forms of trust and control not only serve to
substitute for each other in certain contexts; they also complement and
reinforce each other in other contexts. For example, both goodwill and
competence trust deepens with shared social controls (e.g., joint decisionmaking and dispute resolution processes, attendance at annual meet
ings, scientific presentations and professional discussions, field excur
sions, receptions, dinners and events) (see Proposition 7, Fig. 1), which
then serves to enhance the effectiveness of all controls (Proposition 8,
6
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Fig. 1). Conversely, when agreed objectives are not meeting the expec
tations of the alliance members, goodwill trust can become diminished
and perceived relational risk can increase (Proposition 1, Fig. 1), which
then needs to be supplanted by behaviour controls, issued and/or upheld
by representatives of a given party (Propositions 3 and 5, Fig. 1), helping
to repair goodwill trust with time (Proposition 8, Fig. 1).
A good example of the dynamic interactions between varying forms
of trust and control in reducing the perceived risks of participating to
enhance the performance of the alliance is offered by recent discussions

surrounding the desire to further reduce Greenland’s catch quota due to
the risk of Atlantic salmon extirpation in the USA and Canada [36,39]
(see Table 1). With mounting scientific evidence that the Atlantic
salmon stocks were in decline, members of the West Greenland Com
mission produced the Multi-Annual Regulatory Measure for Fishing for
Salmon at West Greenland for 2015, 2016 and 2017 (WGC 15(21)), which
set out 11 points of agreement, including but not limited to protocols for
reporting salmon catches, protocols for sampling salmon, a defined
salmon fishing season, and a salmon catch quota of no more than 45

Table 1
Trust, control and perceived risk framework applied to the example of Greenland’s Atlantic salmon quota reductions in 2018.
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metric tonnes (behaviour controls). In reaching this agreement, NASCO
members were not able to convince Greenland to further restrict its
harvest of Atlantic salmon below 45 tonnes, despite the advice of sci
entists, resulting in a loss of goodwill trust among the Parties being re
ported in the media [15]. NGO’s subsequently played a leading role in
expressing their frustration publicly, with the president of the Atlantic
Salmon Federation stating:

This Agreement was subsequently implemented into the Executive
Order for Fishery after salmon in 2018, and demonstrates how NASCO as a
strategic alliance helped to facilitate multilateral action on the man
agement of salmon. Goodwill trust was further restored when the Atlantic
Salmon Federation and the North Atlantic Salmon Fund in Iceland (both
NGOs with NASCO observer status) reached a 12-year agreement with
the Greenland association of hunters and fishers, Kalaallit Nunaanni
Aalisartut Piniartullu Kattuffiat (KNAPK), to stop commercial fishing of
wild salmon. The president of the Atlantic Salmon Federation described
the agreement as a win for transboundary resource management: "It’s a
huge win for wild Atlantic salmon, particularly in Canada… In a given year
75 or 80 per cent of salmon caught in Greenland are of Canadian origin"
[37].
The deal was structured around using funds from private donors and
conservation bodies, with no money provided by government agencies.
These funds were provided to KNAPK through the ASF NASF Agreement,
with the goal of augmenting the effectiveness of the 2018 Regulatory
Agreement. Funds were used to incentivize fishers to invest in gear to
participate in other fisheries, thus taking pressure off salmon. That
KNAPK would agree to such a deal is a change of course, given that the
organization has in recent years supported commercial fishing as a
means of Greenland utilizing its own resources [55].
However, in 2019 Greenland’s Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting and
Agriculture reported that the 2018 Atlantic salmon harvest off the
country’s west coast was 40.3 tonnes, more than double the 20-tonne
subsistence quota agreed to by KNAPK [7] damaging goodwill and
competence trust between the organizational actors, and pointing to the
need for further control mechanisms to be explored. In response to this
conservation set-back, an Atlantic Salmon Federation spokesperson
responded that: “It came as a great disappointment… We certainly have a
duty to the people who support us and donate generously to make this
possible… Everyone is keen to come back in year two of this agreement and do
better” [7].
The current (2020) Agreement includes private and confidential
compensation schemes for satisfactory performance, essentially forming
a voluntary environmental program (VEP) designed to induce positive
environmental externalities beyond the requirements of government
legislation [68]. Funds provided to KNAPK are earmarked for distribu
tion among Greenlandic fishers to invest in equipment or gear for tar
geting species other than salmon. Granted funds are also earmarked for
conservation education, as well as for actions that improve the moni
toring and reporting of the agreed upon catch quota (performance con
trols). The ASF NASF Agreement also signals the support of the
Government of Greenland (output control) and establishes that satisfac
tory progress toward upholding the terms of the Agreement will be made
known through NASCO meetings and the information produced by the
West Greenland Commission each year, social controls designed to
mitigate performance risk and enhance competence trust.

"A compromise would have been a subsistence fishery of no more than 20
tonnes, but more than twice this amount is unacceptable… Greenland’s
intent to harvest 45 tonnes each year from 2015 to 2017 will put our
salmon at further risk" [15].
Questions then emerged about the efficacy of the management
control mechanisms supporting the alliance objectives of NASCO. As
noted by a biologist from the US National Marine Fisheries Service in
2016 [82]:
"We’ve tried everything possible to negotiate with Greenland to find al
ternatives to find out how they can lessen impacts on U.S. fish… This is
part of their culture, this is part of who they are, this is something they’ve
always done. We are trying to work with them to realize the fish they are
fishing for originate in Canada, in U.S. waters, in Europe, and these
populations are in decline".
For their part, the Government of Greenland disagreed that a halt to
Inuit fishing would save the salmon population, with a spokesperson
from the Ministry of Fisheries noting that Greenland has been continu
ously reducing its salmon fishery for over twenty years with no
improvement in the population’s status. This view suggests that perfor
mance risk was becoming a major concern for the various Contracting
Parties with decreasing competence trust challenging the performance of
the alliance (Proposition 2, Fig. 1). For Greenland, the main domestic
policy concern related to the importance of salmon fishing to the Inuit
community, which comprise 90% of the total population, and who fish
close to shore and solely for local use [82]:
“Surviving off the resources that nature can offer has been the way that
the tough Inuit of Greenland has survived for thousands of years, and it is
still the way that a large part of the people survive today—and here the
salmon plays a vital part of the history and culture”.
This position is in line with the International Labour Organization
Convention No. 169, also known as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention (1989), a legally-binding international agreement protect
ing the rights of Indigenous peoples, which was ratified by Denmark in
1996, (and Norway in 1990), but has not been ratified by the other
NASCO Parties (2021). In response to the inability of the Contracting
Parties to negotiate a significant further reduction in Greenland’s
salmon quota through the behaviour and social controls outlined in the
Convention and the competence and goodwill trust developed over the
30 + years since the Convention was ratified, NASCO-observing salmon
conservation organizations became more active in the design, imple
mentation, and revision of agreements among Party members, including
the ASF NASF International Conservation Agreement; and, the Multi-annual
Regulatory Measure for fishing for Salmon in West Greenland (WGC(18)
11).
The Multi-annual Regulatory Measure for fishing for Salmon in West
Greenland (WGC(18)11), herein referred to as the 2018 Regulatory
Agreement set out 13 points of agreement, including but not limited to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

5.5. Strategic benefits of the alliance
Increased levels of inter-organizational interaction, coordination,
cooperation and ultimately collaboration are a significant benefit of
NASCO [83,84], helping to navigate the complexity of Atlantic salmon
conservation and facilitating task division, thereby enhancing both
goodwill and competence trust among network members. Examples of
tasks include organizing transboundary scientific research, engaging
with traditional knowledge systems, conducting impact and stocking
assessments, and the monitoring, management and enforcement of
agreed fishery resource management plans, sometimes in remote and
treacherous conditions (see [13]). Another benefit of the alliance has
been the opportunity to engage national and international NGOs in the
management discussions (behavioural and social control) and also in
support of the shared ecosystem-based management objectives (output
control). While NGOs are not formally voting members of NASCO, their
role in facilitating competence trust among the Parties and expanding the

A continued ban on exports of salmon catches
A catch quota of 30 metric tons
A defined salmon fishing season
Protocols for collecting and verifying fishery catch data
Reporting standards for salmon catches
Licensing requirements
Protocols for sampling salmon for stock assessment purposes
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control mechanisms available to the alliance beyond the institutions of
government at key junctures appear to have mitigated performance risk
and enhanced collaboration (Proposition 2, Fig. 1). As noted by the
Chairman of NASCO’s NGOs 1997–2012, “The NGOs have worked suc
cessfully together with NASCO Parties to facilitate much greater transparency
in its work, notably the requirement for each jurisdiction to produce an
implementation plan which now creates public accountability for wild salmon
management around the North Atlantic. Close co-operation and constructive
criticism are essential to help implement both vital research and practical
salmon management measures aimed at conserving and restoring this iconic
species.”
Key, but less well understood, is the extent to which the bureaucratic
alliance has enabled the development of informal management social
control mechanisms. These controls can serve to enhance the goodwill
and competence trust among member organizations (Proposition 7,
Fig. 1), and include annual meetings with associated receptions, dinner
events, field tours, and opportunities for cultural exchange through
reciprocated travel opportunities and joint research expeditions. A
recent example includes the 2018 Salmon summit in Portland, Maine at
the Gulf of Maine Research Institute, where the latest research on
salmon stocks was shared amidst discussions about the 2018 regulatory
agreements. While the interactions between perceived risk, trust and
control within the inter-organizational alliance appear to be supporting
collaborative transboundary fishery governance, it is worth noting that
the north Atlantic salmon populations have continued to decline since
the establishment of NASCO, suggesting a need to expand the policy
boundaries of ecosystem-based fishery management (see also [81]).
Indeed, the External Review of NASCO [56] identified a need for NASCO
to “consider other activities with a significant impact on the environmental
status of these habitats of concern. In the rivers of the Parties, one of the main
concerns has been dam building and the barring of access for salmon to
spawning grounds. Other impacts of concern include aquaculture, in
troductions and transfers and transgenics” in order to meet the objectives
of the Convention. This is another example where the formal engage
ment of NGOs and local communities is likely to be beneficial to
furthering the shared objectives (output control) of the alliance.

Table 2
Risk reduction through trust building and control mechanisms in a trans
boundary fishery alliance (adapted from [17]).
Applicability to Perceived Risk of
Collaborating
Trust Building and Control Mechanisms
Goodwill trust-building
Establishing mutual interests
Individual and team-level trust
Joint dispute resolution
Competence trust-building
Proactive information collection
Joint scientific research
Behaviour control mechanisms
Policies and procedures
Transparency and inclusivity
Reporting structures
Staffing and training
Quotas and catch reporting
Annual meetings
Output control mechanisms
Setting goals and objectives
Setting system boundaries
Monitoring and assessment
Reporting and meeting presentations
Planning and budgeting
Social control mechanisms
Decision-making process
Joint dispute resolution
Meetings, events, field excursions
Ritual, ceremonies and networking

Reducing
Relational Risk

Reducing
Performance Risk

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

and their roles in mitigating perceived risks of inter-organizational
collaboration in RFMOs. Our exploratory case of NASCO offers a first
step towards an expanded conceptualization of the role that trust plays
in collaborative network governance in transboundary fishery settings
and suggests that further research is warranted. In particular, there is a
need to better understand how the managerial strategies and control
mechanisms presented in Table 2 facilitate inter-organizational trust in
RFMOs and mitigate the perceived risks of working together [46]. The
effects of the control mechanisms commonly used in transboundary
fishery networks (e.g., stocking assessments, interagency strategic vision
statements, action plans, decision structures, incentives for informal
interaction, etc.) are generally under-researched in the context of un
derstanding trust and collaboration dynamics through time. Moreover,
as noted by Nielsen [59], it is also important to understand the recursive
nature of trust development over time, for example as organizations
make changes to their aspirations and realign their goals the roles of
trust may change, with different dimensions acting as both a determi
nant and a feature of the relationship. The framework presented in Fig. 1
provides a useful starting point from which we can begin to tackle the
multi-level and multi-directional roles that different types of trust and
control play in different phases of an inter-organizational collaborative
relationship [60].
Our analysis also shows how NGO involvement in the alliance has
grown through time as new relational and performance risks emerged
and goodwill and competence trust were needed. The example of the
ASF NASF Agreement in 2018 nicely demonstrates the ways that NGOs
were able to act in a pragmatic and entrepreneurial manner to imple
ment supplementary performance and behavioural controls, while also
building competence and goodwill trust within the alliance (see
Table 1). As such, although NGOs are not formal member Parties to the
Convention, meaning their actions were officially considered beyond the
activities of NASCO, their involvement has greatly supported the
collaborative performance of the alliance (see also [65]). This is an area
that warrants further policy consideration in the context of trans
boundary fisheries governance, where the creation of formal mecha
nisms to include communities and NGOs may serve to enhance the

6. Discussion and Conclusion
To better understand the inter-organizational factors affecting
collaborative fishery management network performance and offer pol
icy insights of relevance to transboundary resource management, we
explored how the different organizations involved in NASCO draw on
trust and control to mitigate perceived risk of collaboration.
Using Das and Teng’s [17] integrated framework, our analysis
highlights how different dimensions of control and trust can serve
different purposes while also interacting in complex ways to support the
collaborative relationship among inter-organizational alliance members
at different points in time. Table 2 summarizes the results of the analysis,
showing the roles played by different forms of trust and control in
reducing the perceived risks of engaging in inter-organizational alliance
relationships. We recognize that these results are coarse and would
benefit from further empirical work to expand on the various mecha
nisms being used by network managers to support inter-organizational
collaboration on transboundary resource management, however, we
believe that the potential value of the framework to decision-makers is
visible. In particular, our analysis shows that the application of an in
tegrated trust-control-risk framework can increase conceptual clarity for
how, when and why network managers might seek to develop different
forms of trust through diverse management control systems in ways that
further multi-actor collaborative network performance. While a large
and growing number of studies have already identified different di
mensions of trust as being key to developing inter-organizational goal
convergence and collaboration in natural resource management (see for
example [46,72,76,78,80]), none have empirically examined the dy
namic relationships between different dimensions of trust and control,
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performance of the bureaucratic alliance (see also [18]). While one
could imagine that the perceived relational and performance risks
among the different organizations involved may initially be higher, the
potential for effective control mechanisms and different forms of trust to
co-develop through time appears likely to counteract these concerns
when task interdependence is high. In the case of NASCO, NGOs have
increasingly been recognized as facilitating transparency and account
ability in the performance and output controls being used within the
alliance, such as offering input on fish sampling programs, offering
monetary incentives to the in-country fishers association KNAPK,
enhancing competence trust and reducing performance risk. This
recognition is relevant to other RFMOs [18], suggesting that identifying
and including potentially interested NGOs and local rightsholders early
in the process of alliance formation, and engaging them fully in the
transboundary policy discussions, scientific assessment reporting pro
cesses and (in)formal meeting events can accelerate collaborative per
formance of the alliance and, ultimately, increase the likelihood of
ecosystem-based fishery management objectives being realized over
time.
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